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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JA~IES

M. ALEXANDER, R. C.
ALLRED, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.-

HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD
HACKING and STEW ART M.
HANSON, COMMISSIONERS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No.

8471

Brief of Defendants
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants essentially agree to the Statement of
Facts of the plaintiffs but not to the conclusions of the
plaintiffs set forth therein.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE APPLIED FOR LICENSES TO
TREAT HUMAN AILMENTS WITHOUT DRUGS OR
MEDICINE AND WITHOUT OPERATIVE SURGERY;
AND THEY MUST USE THE NAME OF THEIR SCHOOL
IN THEIR LICENSE.

POINT II
THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY; THE LICENSING STATUTES ARE UNAMBIGUOUS.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE
OBSTETRICS; AND IF SO QUALIFIED, THEY CANNOT
USE DRUGS, MEDICINE OR SURGERY.

POINT IV
THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
REGISTRATION IS NOT A LICENSE REVOCATION
PROCEEDING, BUT MERELY ONE TO MAKE THE
LICENSE ISSUED CONFORM TO THE LAW.
ARGU~IEXT

POIXT I
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE APPLIED FOR LICENSES TO
TREAT HUMAN AILMENTS WITHOUT DRUGS OR
MEDICINE AND WITHOUT OPERATIVE SURGERY;
AND THEY MUST USE THE NAME OF THEIR SCHOOL
IN THEIR LICENSE.
All of the plaintiffs haYc made application for license
under tlw proYi ~ions of S~_•ction ;)8-l~-~. Utah Code .Anno-
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tated 1953 (or under similar provision in prior laws),
which reads in part as follows :
''Every applicant for such license must:
*
"(2) Designate in his application whether he
desires to practice medicine and surgery in all
branches thereof or to treat human ailments
without the use of drugs or medicine and without
operative surgery. If he desires to treat human
ailments without the use of drugs or medicines
and without operative surgery, the designation
shall be in accordance with the tenets of the professional school, college or institution of which
he is a graduate."
*

ol('

It is to be noted that plaintiffs failed to cite or
explain the foregoing statute in their brief. A mere reading of the section shows clearly that the Legislature
intended that the applicant for the license designate the
scope of his intended practice, and all of these plaintiffs
have applied for a license to practice the treatment of
human ailments without the use of drugs or medicine and
withotttt operative surgery.

It is also to be noted that the foregoing section
makes only two classifications. It does not mention
naturopaths, chiropractors, or any other of many ''drugless healers.'' The only place the names of the various
healing groups come to the forefront is by the applicant
designating which name his school used. The statutes
of our state do not otherwise authorize the issuance of
a license to "naturopathic physicians.''
When the foregoing section is rea(l 111 conjunction
with Section ;}8-J :2-:1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, it be-
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comes clear that when subsection (3) says:
''To practice the treatment of human ailments
without the use of drugs or medicine and without
operative surgery in accordance with the tenets
of the professional school, college or institution
of which the applicant is a graduate as designated
in his application for license, * * * ''
the Legislature had in mind only appending the proper
name to the license and did not have in mind the granting of broad additional rights to practice. The plaintiffs
would have us believe that the foregoing subsection is
an "escalator" type provision which -would enable the
'' drugless healer'' groups to change the curriculum of
their professional schools and thus ipso facto change or
enlarge the scope of their practice even to the dispensing
of drugs, medicine and performing surgery. Such a
construction flies in the face of the prohibitive part of
both of the foregoing sections which states that the
practice shall be "without drugs or medicine and 1cifhout operative surgery."
In addition, the applicants ha-ve all designated that
they ·were applying for a license to "treat human ailments \Yithout the use of drugs or medicine and without
operatiYe surgery" and they should be so limited.

POINT II
THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY; THE LICENSING STATUTES ARE UNAMBIGUOUS.

The plaintiffs urge that there is an ambiguity in the
~tatnl<' and that now, by long administrative interpre-
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tation, the plaintiffs have gained rights not specified in
the licensing statutes. If any strength is to be given to
this proposition, then the plaintiffs should lose because,
since at least 1921 to lVIay, 1939, the same essential
licensing provisions of our laws were uniformly construed
by the Department of Business Regulation so as to exclude the use of drugs, medicine, and surgery, to which
construction many of the plaintiffs gave their assent by
many years of licensing. Then in JVIay, 1939, the first
licenses were issued which included obstetrics and minor
surgery. However, the Department challenged the issuance of said licenses (p. 6 of petition; p. 13 of plaintiffs'
brief; p. 9 of petition), but later the Department acquiesced in the opinions of the Attorney General (p. 8 of
petition), but now the Department of Business Regulation has gone back to its pre-1939 position of interpretation. The most striking fact to be gained from the
scrutiny of the record of administrative interpretation
after 1939 is that there has not been any consistent, uniform, long-continued interpretation of the licensing statute in question.
vVhat happened to the licensing provisions in 1939,
so that new licenses were issued to these plaintiffs who
were completely outside the scope of ''drugless healing~''
There was not any basic change in the ]icensing law in
1939! Section 58-12-2 and Section 58-12-3 were not
changed. Ho,Ycver, a nmv section (Section 58-12-22) was
enacted which tightened up the educational requirements
for "naturopathic physicians." Section 58-12-2 ( 3) provides that an applicant for a license to treat human ailments y;ithout the nse of drugs or meclieine and \Yithout
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operative surgery must "Have the preliminary and professional education hereinafter provided for." The mere
fact that the Legislature saw fit to require more education for a particular group of practitioners does not mean
that by amending or adding to those requirements, the
scope of their licenses was enlarged. This change in the
educational requirement for "naturopathic physicians"
apparently caused some uncertainty in the Department
but it has now returned to its earlier construction of the
licensing law.
Plaintiffs concede that an administrative interpretation is not binding on the Court (p. 45 of brief). It must
also be recognized that even the administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute is no more than persuasive to the Court because otherwise the Court would be
ousted of its jurisdiction to review the actions of inferior
tribunals. Further, if plaintiffs' argument be sound, then
an administratiYe agency is powerless to correct its
mistakes! That is not the law in "Ctah.
However, in this case, the plaintiffs are trying to
compel the defendant agency to take an interpretation
of a statute \Yhich it has repudiated. Certainly, the Court
is free to decide ·what the law is without any concern as
to what the aclministratiYe agency thinks the law is, and
where the agency has changed its mind as to the interpretation, the former interpretation can certainly haYe
no binding force on the Court.
The plaintiffs have searched diligently for some
ambiguity in thP licensing statutes which would justify
the application of tlw "contempornneon~ administratiYe
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interpretation" rule. The plantiffs cite Section 58-1-5,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as in some manner creating
an ambiguity. We submit that it does not do so. Both
chiropractors and naturopaths have their representative
committees, as well as the other committee to represent
those who want t_o treat human ailments without drugs
or medicine and without operative surgery. The only
significance this fact seems to have is that chiropractors
and naturopaths have become so numerous and so well
identified that it seemed proper to the Legislature to
give them representative committees to assist the Department of Business Regulation. It still is basic that
the only place that these groups are authorized to be
licensed is under Section 58-12-2 in the category of those
who apply for a license to "treat human ailments without
the use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery." It may be supposed that if some other "drugless
healer'' group becomes cohesive and well identified, they
also may have a representative committee. However,
it would appear obvious that the mere fact that a group
has a representative committee does not give that committee authority to enlarge the scope of practice beyond
the limits set by the Legislature. It is the prerogative
of the Legislature to make such a change.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE
OBSTETRICS; AND IF SO QUALIFIED, THEY CANNOT
USE DRUGS, MEDICINE OR SURGERY.

Section 58-12-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
that if an individual who has applied for a licence to
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practice the treatment of human ailments without the
use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery
successfully passes the examination in obstetrics, his
license shall set forth his right to practice obstetrics. The
plaintiffs assume that the only interpretation to be put
on this provision is that a person so licensed must use
drugs, medicine and surgery in the practice of obstetrics.
This conclusion does not necessarily follow. It is a
matter of common knowledge that the midwife has practiced obstetrics in this State for many years even until
the present time without medicine, drugs or surgery. It
is also a matter of common knowledge that in recent
years there has been a considerable amount of writings
by medical professionals extolling the virtues of natural,
painless childbirth achieved through psychiatry andjor
hypnotic suggestion. In view of these known things, it
is not at all incompatible ''ith the concept of." drugless
healing" to authorize a naturopath to practice obstetrics
without the use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery.
It is to be noted that \Yebster 's International Dictionan· defines "obstetrics" as the "science of midwifer~T; the art of assisting women in parturition; mid\Yifery; the management of pregnancy and labor.··
It is adn1itted hy plaintiffs that the only exan1ination to test the qualifications of naturopaths to practice
obstetrics has been giYen by the naturopath rommittee
established by Section 58-1-5(11). Ho,vever, Section
58-1-5(9) provides:
''For practitioners of medicine and surger:·
in all branches thereof, and for the practice of
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obstetrics only, a committee of five persons each
of whom shall be a licensed practitioner of medicine and surgery in all branches thereof in this
state * * *."
This foregoing section is the only place where the licensing statutes mention the committee or group that shall
be concerned with the practice of obstetrics. Certainly,
the Legislature did not intend to have various groups and
committees each examining applicants for the purpose
of practicing obstetrics in accordance with the particular
committee's views on the subject. There would not be
any uniform standard of qualification or practice which
would most certainly range from the use of hypnosis to
the use of surgery. It is submitted that the Legislature
intended that the qualification of all persons desiring to
practice obstetrics should be tested by one committee
and that committee is the one created by Section
58-1-5(9), cited above. These plaintiffs have not been so
qualified.
The plaintiffs seek some help for their position by
referring to Section 58-12-3, which uses the wordR "without operative surgery.'' The point of their argument
being to the effect that by implication, they may practice
surgery as long as it is not ''operative surgery.'' The
only case coming to our attention where a statute using
the words "operative surgery" has been construed by a
court is the ease of State v. 1'hierfelder, 114 Mont. 104,
132 P. 2d 1035, 1041, where the court said:
''According to all medical authorities 'operative surgery' includes both major and minor
surgery."
As far as obstetrics IS concerned, plaintiffs have not
9
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classified the surgery which they consider has been authorized them by that part of the licensing statute. (For
other cases, see opinion of Attorney General, #55-101,
attached to petition.)
POINT IV
THE INTENDED ACTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
REGISTRATION IS NOT A LICENSE REVOCATION
PROCEEDING, BUT MERELY ONE TO MAKE THE
LICENSE ISSUED CONFORM TO THE LAW.
In Point Five in their brief, plaintiffs assume that
the threatened action of the defendants is one of revocation of outstanding licenses. \Y e say that it is not a
revocation proceeding. The Department has determined
that through inadvertence, mistake, or incorrect advice,
licenses have been issued which purport to grant to
plaintiffs the right to practice in a professional area for
which they are not authorized to apply and which the
Department is not authorized to issue. It is a fundamental proposition that if an agency attempts to issue a
license without authority, the license is void. All of the
licensing authority ·which the Department holds has been
delegated by the Legislature, and an attempted e::dension of the authority by the Department is a nullity.
Plaintiffs' Point Five deals with the revocation for
ca n~e of licenses othen,Tisc validly issued. In this case,
the only action threatened is to put proper limits on the
license and not to revoke any license.
Plaintiffs also assent in thPir Point Fin: that no
q IIP~-d ion of public health lw.s been raisPL1, nor has any
question of qna1ifieation of plaintiffs been raisf'(1. Of
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course, a failure to raise the question of qualification or
public health does not mean that such questions do not
exist. However, since this action (of the Department) is
not a revocation proceeding but rnerely to make the
license conform to the licensing authority of the Department, it makes no difference vd1ether plajntiffs are qualified or not. If the Department does not have the autlwrity
to license plaintiffs under their applications, to engage
in the extended practice, then it makes no difference how
qualified the applicant is. If plaintiffs wish to practice
medicine and surgery, in all of its branches, let them so
apply and demonstrate their qualifications. However,
since plaintiffs have applied to be licensed to practice
the "treatment of human ailments without drugs or medicine and u·ithout operative surgery," then let their
licenses and practice be so limited. The prohibitive and
limiting words are so clear in our licensing statute that
there is not any reasonable room to say that they do
not mean that these plaintiffs must confine their practice
to the treatment of human ailments without drugs or
medicine and without operative surgery.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' application for a writ of mandamus should
be denied, and order heretofore issued to the defendant
should be quashed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

PETER J\!L LOWE
Deputy Attorney G('ueral
AttoniP?JS for n('j('J/(1a11ts
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